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Abstract: In Logical Investigations, published by Husserl in 1900/1901, the phenomenology is understood as a peculiar 
form of descriptive psychology, elaborated to serve as a foundation for the theory of knowledge. The peculiarity of 
this descriptive psychology is that it would be able to achieve a priori knowledge on the psyche. In this article, we try 
to show, in contrast to the classical empiricism of the 16th and 17th century and the Kant’s transcendental idealism, 
the peculiarity of the psychological method in Logical Investigations, as well as the reasons by which this method was 
founded as the basis for the theory of knowledge.
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Introduction
Logical investigations is one of the most important 
works of phenomenological tradition, established in the 20th 
century. It is a work of rupture, because Husserl details, 
for the first time, the phenomenological method of analysis 
of the essences of psychic experiences, while distancing 
himself, in certain key points, from his master Brentano 
(Peres, 2014). Even today, the book is cited and praised, 
especially due to its critique of psychologism and for the 
accuracy of its psychological analysis. 
The book has two editions. The first edition 
appeared in two volumes in 1900 and 1901. The second 
edition, which is more familiar to the public, appeared in 
1913. In the second edition, Husserl made an extensive 
review of his first work. His objective was to harmonize 
it with his new discoveries, specially, with his method of 
the transcendental reduction2, which is covered in detail in 
his second great work, also from 1913, Ideas Pertaining 
to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy. In this work, Husserl wanted to show that the 
phenomenology, once conducted from the transcendental 
reduction method, should be understood not as a form 
of psychology, but rather as a form of transcendental 
philosophy. Namely, in 1913, Husserl starts to argue that 
epistemology should be founded on transcendental or pure 
phenomenology. Although pure phenomenology was an 
analysis of the structures of consciousness, it should not 
be taken as a form of psychology (Husserl, 1911/1965). 
Psychology (of essences or facts) is always build in a naïf 
1 Financial support: Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São 
Paulo (Fapesp).
* Corresponding address: savioperes@yahoo.com.br
2 This cannot be confused with the eidetic reduction method, also called 
the analysis of essences, which was already in the first edition of the 
book, although the term “eidetic reduction,” as well as “eidetic psycho­
logy,” were introduced later.
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concept of reality and, as consequence, it is not able to 
found the epistemology with the necessary radicalism.
Naturally, the transcendental turn of phenome­
nology, which began around 1906/1907, generated a 
problem for Husserl. After all, how can one characterize 
the phenomenology of Logical Investigations, once he 
did not employ transcendental reduction in this book? 
However, Husserl knew the value of Logical Investigations, 
a works containing more than a thousand pages of dense 
philosophical analyses, which cost him almost a decade 
of hard work. Furthermore, Logical Investigations were 
responsible for having launched him into a prominent 
position in the German academic field, and it served 
as an inspiration not only to philosophers, but also for 
psychologists (Kusch, 1995). However, in 1913, Husserl 
had to face the following problem: Should the method 
employed in Logical Investigations still be understood as 
a psychological method? How can one characterize the 
method that he employed in this work? His latter solution 
was to separate the phenomenology into two parts: a 
phenomenological psychology, which should be considered 
a form of descriptive and a priori psychology (or eidetic 
psychology) and a pure phenomenology (or transcendental 
phenomenology) (Kockelmans, 1994). From 1917 onward, 
Husserl (1917/1987; 1997) would argue that there is a 
parallelism between these two disciplines, so that the 
results of one may be transposed, with some adjustments, 
to the other. This is the reason why Husserl continued 
perceiving the phenomenology from Logical Investigations 
as a form of psychology, although eidetic (1925/1962).
In this article, I will limit myself to the first edition of 
Logical Investigations, because my aim is to cover some of 
the systematic requirements, as well as the historical 
sense, that led Husserl to understand phenomenology as 
a form of descriptive and a prior psychology. The axis of 
the analyses will be the relationship between the theory 
of subjectivity and theory of knowledge. I chose the first 
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edition because it clearly presents the context that leads 
Husserl to the phenomenology as a kind psychological 
method. Furthermore, by focusing on the first edition, 
we can observe the genetic development of the author’s 
thought, without submerging into the sea of complications 
that arise with the introduction of the transcendental 
reduction and the reviews operated in the second edition.
The first volume, published in 1900, Prolegomena 
to Pure Logic, caused a profound impact at the time. In 
this volume Husserl was committed to: (i) defending that 
logic was an autonomous theoretical science, a priori, of 
laws and ideal objects and not of experiences; (ii) arguing 
that any attempt to reduce logic to psychology incurred 
in relativism; and (iii) submitting the guidelines for the 
realization of pure logic (from which syllogistic would 
be one of its branches). The second part of the volume, 
published in 1901, was titled Investigations about the 
Phenomenology and Theory Knowledge. This second 
vo lume was divided into six investigations, each one 
dedicated to a separate, although complementary theme. 
In this second volume, what caught the attention 
of his contemporaries, especially the psychologists, were 
the meticulous analyses of intentionality, conducted 
especially in the fifth and sixth investigation. Even though 
these analyses clearly provided a valuable contribution 
to psychology, it should be noted that, as the title of the 
second part suggests, the volume contains more than 
a psychological analysis. Psychology was not the end, 
but the means. The primary interest of Husserl was not 
to contribute to the body of knowledge of psychology, 
but rather to employ the psychological method for 
the elucidation of epistemological problems (Husserl, 
1925/1962). In a few words, the full elucidation of the 
problem “What is knowledge?” demands the question 
“What is the experiences of knowing?”. Once a lived 
experience is a psychological process, then there is a clear 
link between theory of knowledge and psychology. Now we 
have the decisive question: Which psychological method 
is most appropriate for this task? Inspire by Brentano, 
Husserl’s answer is: a kind of inner­descriptive analysis of 
lived experiences, namely, descriptive psychology, in short, 
phenomenology.
As Husserl says in the preface of the second 
volume, his goal was to present a new theory of knowledge: 
“Phenomenology is, essentially, a descriptive psychology. 
As a result, the critique of knowledge is essentially 
psychology, or at least something that can only build in 
the field of psychology” (1901/1984, p. 23).3 Therefore, the 
sense of the psychological method can only be properly 
clarified by the reconstruction of the epistemological 
problem faced by Husserl, which requires a series of 
3 From now on, I will use, unless otherwise stated, the edition from 1901. 
The 1901 text can be found both in Husserliana XVIII, XIX/1, XIX/2, and 
in the Portuguese edition (Husserl, 2007; 2012; 2014), which presents, in 
the body of the text, both editions from 1900/1901 and the revised edition 
from 1913. Since the Portuguese edition contains the pagination of the 
German edition, I used the pagination of the Husserliana edition, although 
the quotes have been taken from the Portuguese edition. 
conceptual distinctions to be conducted, in addition to an 
analysis of the philosophical context of the time.
It is true that there were other authors in the 
philosophical tradition, especially in the modernity, that 
sought the foundation of epistemology in psychology. 
But there is something new in Husserl. His theory of 
knowledge does not rely on the empirical psychology, 
but in a form of intentional descriptive psychology, ca­
pable of reaching a priori knowledge. If, over the 
course of intellectual history, the various proposals of a 
psychological foundation of theory of knowledge have 
always incurred in aporias and problems, such as solipsism 
and relativism, that occurred, per Husserl, because they 
sustained themselves in a misconception of subjectivity, a 
concept that does not consider its most fundamental trait, 
intentionality (Husserl, 1925/1962). What Husserl calls 
psychologism in the Prolegomena is no other thing than 
a bad foundation of logic, a foundation that rests in some 
kind of empirical psychology, and, as consequence, always 
leads to relativism.
On the other hand, there is an essential link between 
Theory of Knowledge and a Theory of Subjectivity. And 
Husserl proposes a a new theory of knowledge, built on 
a basis of an adequate description of the structure of the 
various types of experiences, i.e., those experiences that are 
characterized by being conscious of something (Husserl, 
1901/1984). 
In short, the phenomenology of Logical Inves­
tigations can be understood as a non­psychologist psy­
chology directed towards solving problems of the theory 
of knowledge. For this reason, his phenomenology must be 
contextualized in the light of the critique of psychologism, 
on the one hand, and the epistemology, on the other. 
However, such coordination is easier to be indicated than 
performed. In order to observe this double link, we initially 
see the relationship between psychology and theory of 
knowledge, situating the thought of Husserl in a broader 
context of the history of philosophy. Later, we will observe 
the link between psychology and logic.
Psychology and theory of knowledge
According to Husserl (1927/1997; 1925/1962), from 
Descartes up to the end of the 19th century, there are two 
principles that remain presupposed by the vast majority of 
philosophers: (i) the conception of the theory of knowledge 
must be founded on a science of subjectivity. That is, 
anyone who wants to understand what knowledge is and 
how it is produced must focus on the cognitive operations 
of the mind, or, more particularly, of human understanding. 
(ii) Human subjects have no immediate access to such 
things as they are in themselves, i.e., the human subject 
has direct access only to his/her own representations. This 
last principle could be called “principle of immanence” or 
the “principle of subjectivity” (Porta, 2013). As we will 
see, Husserl partially accepts the first thesis and rejects the 
second.
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These two theses are both present in the empiricist 
tradition and the transcendental idealism of Kant. In his 
Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that the human 
being only has immediate access to phenomena (which 
are understood as representations of consciousness) and 
every attempt to achieve a thing in itself (Ding an sich) is 
speculative metaphysics. However, Husserl calls attention 
to an important difference between Kant and the main 
authors of empiricism (1976). The difference concerns the 
approach of subjectivity or conscience4. Empiricists tried 
to understand the knowledge by describing the subjectivity 
itself (1925/1962). For the empiricist tradition, the concept 
of inner perception (reflection or inner sense) is central. 
Locke, for example, is an exemplary case. In the first chapter 
of book II of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
the English philosopher advocates that there are two and 
only two sources of knowledge about the facts: the inner 
sense and the external sense. While the external sense is 
a source of knowledge of external objects, the inner sense 
or reflection is a source of knowledge of the operations of 
the interior life (Locke, 1690/1975). Hence, for Locke, to 
carry out a theory of knowledge free from metaphysical 
speculation, it is necessary to rely exclusively on empirical 
data obtained by inner perception. Only through reflection 
can one establishes the laws that explain (i) how ideas are 
formed (representations) based on sense data and (ii) how 
the ideas relate to each other (association, resemblance, 
contiguity, etc.).
Kant, as we know, rejects the empiricist thesis that 
the theory of knowledge must be based on experience, 
that is, data obtained by the inner sense. The problem of an 
empirical approach to subjectivity is that every empirical 
science of facts is not able to reach knowledge in the 
strong sense of the word, that is, universal and necessary 
knowledge. Empiricism, especially after Hume, only 
accepts two classes of possible knowledge, which Hume 
called, in section IV of his Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding, “matters of fact” and “relations of ideas” 
(Hume, 1748/2007). This differentiation appears in Kant 
(1787/2010) as a difference between synthetic a posteriori 
judgments and a priori analytical judgments. The first 
class of judgments is never necessary; the second class, 
despite having the character of necessity (for example, 
“every single is not married”), consists only in the analysis 
of meanings and so does not provide any new information. 
In this background, one of the main problems of 
the Critique of pure Reason is to achieve a necessary and 
universal, yet non­analytic, knowledge about subjectivity. 
In other words, Kant must find a way to reach a priori 
science of human understanding. This “science” is what 
Kant referred to as transcendental philosophy. “I name as 
transcendental all cognition that deals not so much with 
objects, but rather with our way of cognizing what is to be a 
priori possible” (Kant, 1787/2010, p. 53). It is clear that this 
4 According to Husserl, Kant’s transcendental problem is in the field of 
consciousness (Bewustsein). “Kant s transzendentale Problematik be­
wegt sich im Felde des Bewustseins” (1925/1962, p. 517). 
science of subjectivity cannot be founded on experience, 
because the latter only gives possible knowledge.
But why does Kant see the necessity of an a priori 
science of subjectivity? The reason is that he intends 
to support the universality and necessity of sciences 
(especially geometry, Newtonian physics, and arithmetic) 
in the a priori structures of subjectivity. The famous 
Copernican revolution is to stablishes subjectivity as the 
ultimate source of the necessity of the principles of science. 
The possibility of synthetic a priori principles in sciences, 
such as the causal principle, depends on the presence 
of universal and necessary structures in the subject. 
Experiences alone cannot give us necessary knowledge. 
Therefore, it is not by chance that Kant rejects experience, 
reflection in special, as the foundation of the theory of 
knowledge. 
However, Kant does not reject the thesis that 
the theory of knowledge must be founded on a theory 
of subjectivity. Kant’s problem is to raise a non­
empirical theory of subjectivity. His solution lies in 
transcendental deduction. Kant offers not an empirical 
theory of subjectivity, but rather a transcendental one. A 
transcendental theory does not investigate what is given 
in experience, nor that which is beyond experience, but 
what is before experience, i.e., what enables experience. 
Kant reaches the categories of understanding and forms 
of sensitivity not by an inner description his experiences, 
but rather by a regressive, constructive and deductive 
process, which is called by Husserl “regressive method” 
(1936/1976). The Kantian transcendental subject is not 
subjectivity as described by the subject, but a principle of 
logical and epistemological foundation. In other words, the 
categories of understanding and forms of sensibility are, 
for Kant, conditions without which the synthetic a priori 
knowledge about the phenomena would not be possible. 
Such categories do not come from experience, since they 
are those that make the experience possible. The experience 
only gives us objects. The subjective conditions are not 
objects at all, and therefore cannot be given in experience. 
The argument works for the method of reflection, which is 
found in inner sense. There are conditions without which 
the inner sense would not be possible, for example, the 
form of time. 
Husserl’s project, as we will see, leis in a kind of 
middle term between the empirical and Kantian conception 
of subjectivity. We must emphasize, however, that Husserl 
does not reach a simple “middle ground” between these two 
currents of thought. Husserl seeks to accomplish something 
that would have haunted both classic empiricists and Kant. 
On the one hand, he wants to erect phenomenology from 
data obtained through inner perception, but, on the other 
hand, he seeks to achieve, as Kant did, a priori knowledge 
regarding the subjectivity, that is, universal and necessary 
knowledge. What we should examine carefully is how he 
intends to do it and what Husserl means by a priori. 
For Husserl, a priori knowledge is knowledge of 
essences (eidos). Hence, a priori sciences (including pure 
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logic) are sciences of essences (1925/1962, p. 39). Husserl’s 
solution to accomplish a descriptive a priori psychology 
is not relying exclusively in the inner perception, but in 
eidetic intuition operated from data obtained from the 
inner perception. The eidetic intuition, the vision of essence 
(Wesensschau), can be understood, in the broadest sense of 
word, as a kind of experience. 
Let’s take the following proposition “all valuation 
experience requires necessarily an experience of pre­
sentation (Vorstellung) of something.”5 It is a universal and 
necessary judgment. It is impossible for me to evaluate 
something as being good or useful without having an 
experience of presentation in that something. This law 
is valid for any valuation act, no matter what it is. The 
valuation act is not the act of presentation, since it is 
possible to have an act of presentation without having 
an act of valuation. We observe that the eidetic law does 
not establish a relationship of coexistence and succession 
among facts, such as, for example, “where there is smoke, 
there is fire” or “what goes up must come down.” It is 
conceivable that there is smoke where there is no fire, 
just as it is conceivable that something can go up and not 
come down. On the other hand, the relationship that exists 
between the experience of valuing and the experience of 
presentation is not discovered by induction. It is not the 
result of a generalization. It is impossible for an experience 
of valuing to exist without an experience of presentation 
(just as it is impossible for a sound without a crest). This is 
an a priori law, a law that expresses a necessary relationship 
between different types of experiences (in this case, the 
experience of valuing and the experience of presenting). 
Each class of experiences, such as knowing, 
remembering, fantasizing and meaning have its own 
kind of structure. Therefore, eidetic psychology must: 
(i) classify the types of experiences, (ii) conceptually fix the 
essential structure of each type of experience, (iii) clarify 
the essential relationships between the different types of 
experiences, and (iv) clarify the forms of relationships 
between the experiences and other entities (the body itself, 
the world, culture, etc.). The structure of sensitive perceptual 
experiences is different from affective experiences, which, 
in turn, is different from that of remembering experiences 
or linguistic experiences, etc. Thus, Husserl sometimes 
says that phenomenology restores the old idea presented in 
Wolf (1679­1754) of an a priori psychology, albeit purged of 
metaphysical reminiscences (Husserl, 1925/1962). 
Husserl opposes fact and essence. Every fact is a 
unique, unrepeatable event and is subject to time. Essence, 
on the other hand, is something ideal and can be exemplified 
in several facts. That is, several real e so different facts may 
have the same ideal essence. Two experiences of perception 
5 Husserl uses in Logical Investigations the expression Vorstellung, which 
is sometimes translated as “representation”. I decided, in this case, to use 
the expression “presentation”, because it avoids conceptual confusion 
from representationalism. In the presentation, an object is empty (non­
­intuitive) or full (intuitive). These acts of presentation, Husserl calls, in 
the last Investigation, are objectivating acts.
(taken in their factuality) are never identical; however, 
the essence of perception is always the same. With the 
distinction between fact and essence, Husserl distinguished 
the psychology of facts (or empirical psychology) and 
psychology of essences. At this point, there is much 
misunderstanding present in the Husserlian literature. 
Firstly, it is not true that Husserl rejects the psychology 
of facts (empirical psychology). What he rejects is any 
project of empirical psychology that violates the laws of 
essences obtained by eidetic psychology and, particularly 
in Prolegomena, any project that aims to found logic in 
empirical psychology (Husserl, 1911/1984). 
There are several problems regarding the idea of 
founding logic in an empirical science. For Husserl, logic 
is an a priori science, that is, a universal and necessary 
science, whereas empirical psychology is, at best, a con­
tingent science able to obtain probable knowledge. It is 
impossible to found an a priori science in a contingent 
science (possible) (Husserl, 1900/1975). However, the im­
pos sibility of founding necessary laws in contingent laws 
does not imply abandoning the project to founding logic in 
a theory of subjectivity. On the contrary, it is an important 
task founding logic in an essential analysis of logical 
experiences. Founding, in this context, does not mean to 
deduce logic from psychology, mas clarify the relationship 
between logic and subjectivity. In Logical Investigations, 
Husserl believed that only eidetic psychology can achieve 
this task, insofar it is a science able to achieve necessary 
laws regarding the psychic life (1925/1962). 
In summary, although the phenomenology has 
the experience and, in particular, inner perception as its 
starting point, it is not a form of “psychology of facts” or 
“empirical psychology.” While empiricism seeks to find 
laws of coexistence and succession of psychological facts, 
Husserl seeks to examine not the fact itself or the contingent 
relations among the facts, but rather the essence inherent to 
these facts, as well as their essential relationships. Eidetic 
psychology limits itself to takes a fact as an exemplary of 
an essence. The psychic fact, obtained by inner perception, 
is nothing more than the initial route of access to the 
essence, grabbed by eidetic intuition. 
Ideality and reality
In the light of the previous discussion, we can now 
affirm that Husserl, in Logical investigations, remains, to 
some extent, stuck to the tradition of seeking the foundation 
of the theory of knowledge in a science of subjectivity. But 
this is only true to a certain extent, because this subjective 
direction of the research consists of half of the task. To 
understand what knowledge is, we need another direction 
of research that is complementary, whose task is to esta­
blish the conditions of objective possibility (or logic) of 
knowledge, which are based on the objective­ideal content 
of knowledge.
Husserl distinguishes the noetic from the objec­
tive conditions of possibility of knowledge. The noetic 
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conditions lie in the subject. They concern the conditions 
that any knowing subject must have to achieve knowledge. 
For this reason, these conditions do not regard to the 
empirical peculiarity of human knowledge as being 
psychologically conditioned; For the other hand, we 
have purely logical conditions, i.e., based solely on the 
laws in which knowledge rests (Husserl, 1900/1975). 
Noetic conditions concern the structure of knowing lived 
experiences, whereas the logic conditions concern the 
logical content of the knowing experiences.
It is true that we cannot really separate the objective 
content and the experience of knowledge, as we cannot 
really separate the tone and the sound. However, although 
inseparable, they are distinguishable. Two or more expe­
riences of knowledge may have the same objective content. 
Each experience of knowledge that occurs in the stream 
of consciousness is always a unique experience, distinct 
from other experiences. Husserl, in Logical Investigations, 
understands that every experience is a real factual psy­
chic event and every real factual event is unique and 
unrepeatable (1901/1984). An experience never repeats 
itself identically. Two or more people cannot have the same 
exact experiences. However, the objective content, as it is 
not a real integral part of experience, can be repeated and 
shared among various subjects. 
This distinction, between the experience of know­
ledge and its objective content plays an crucial role in 
Logical Investigations. It is precisely this distinction that 
delimits the field of phenomenology from the field of 
logic. Phenomenology deals with lived experiences and, 
particularly, with the experiences of knowledge, while pure 
logic deals with the formal structures of the objective­ideal 
content of theoretical knowledge. For Husserl, science is 
not the sum of all experiences (or acts) of knowledge: 
We understand a theory as a certain ideal content of 
possible knowledge and, exactly in the same way, 
we understand the truth, the law, etc. . . . theory 
is not built on acts, but rather on purely ideal 
elements, of truth, and in purely ideal ways, in the 
forms of foundation and consequence. (Husserl, 
1900/1975/p. 179)
A scientific theory is an ideal objective unit that 
becomes accessible to many individuals by language: 
“science exists objectively only in its literature, only in 
written work does it have a rich relational being . . . 
in this form, it is propagated down the millennia and 
survives individuals, generations and nations.” (Husserl, 
1900/1975, p. 28). The linguistic signs, therefore, do not 
transmit experiences, but rather ideal contents. We can 
say that science, for Husserl, is a systematic theoretical 
set of objective ideal meanings that deals with a given 
field of objects. The task of pure logic is to investigate the 
necessary structures that belong to every possible theory, 
i.e., the objective ideal conditions without which a theory 
could not exist, such as the principle of contradiction. If pure 
logic investigates the essence of ideal objective structures 
(meanings, theories, proposals, etc.), then phenomenology 
(as presented in Logical Investigations), on the other hand, 
studies the essence of real experiences, belonging to the 
stream of consciousness.
The key of Logical Investigations is that, for 
Husserl, there is a correlation between logic and phenome­
nology. “Despite only the ideal analysis and not the 
phenomenological analysis originally belonging to pure 
logic, the latter cannot be dismissed. Because all that 
belongs to the logical order should have its subjective 
realization” (Husserl, 1901/1984, p. 4). There is a correlation 
between the objective­ideal­logical content and the logical 
experience. That is the correlation that we should now 
examine.
Ideality and subjectivity
The thesis of the objective validity of logical­ideal 
entities such as propositions, truths, theories, requires 
a conception of subjectivity distinct from that which is 
present in empiricism, either the classical empiricism of the 
17th and 18th centuries, or that developed in the 19th century 
by Mill (1900/1975). For Husserl, empiricism, by denying 
the validity of ideal entities and reducing the knowledge to 
psychic facts, must be abandoned, once it inevitably leads 
to skepticism and relativism (1900/1975). The empiricist 
conception of subjectivity is not only blind to ideality, but is 
also incompatible with them. But if Husserl shows that the 
assumptions present in empiricism violates the objective 
conditions of knowledge, this does not imply abandoning 
the idea that epistemology requires a theory of subjectivity. 
On the contrary, the thesis of objectivity of logical entities 
requires a certain conception of subjectivity, in which the 
psychological subject is able to access them. Therefore, 
the objective conditions of theoretical knowledge imply 
subjective conditions. One of these conditions is the 
intentionality of consciousness. Consciousness is not a 
closed box. It is not true that consciousness can only grasp 
what is found inside itself, i.e. its subjective content. If 
this were the case, the apprehension of ideal entities (not 
psychic and objective) would be impossible. And, in fact, 
Husserl dedicated to show that the most part of experiences 
that make up the stream of consciousness are intentional, 
as they direct to objects that transcend the stream of 
consciousness (Husserl, 1901/1984). If I am aware of a 
table, the experience of perception is subjective, it belongs 
to a stream­of­consciousness, but the intentional object, 
the table, is not subjective. The table is something that 
transcends the real content of experience. Similarly, if I am 
aware of a theorem, the object of my consciousness is the 
theorem itself, and not my experience of representing the 
theorem. 
As we have seen, the acceptance of ideal entities 
implies accepting an intentional theory of subjectivity. 
However, for Husserl, it is not enough to postulate 
noetic (or subjective) conditions of knowledge, such as 
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intentionality and the ability to see the truth (evidence). It 
is not sufficient to assert, in a purely argumentative way, 
that such conditions must effectively exist in the subject, 
because otherwise we would have, as consequence, the 
impossibility of knowledge. It is necessary to com ple ment 
this argument based on the consequences with a descriptive 
explanation of noetic conditions of knowledge (1901/1984). 
The theory of knowledge must not just “build” a conception 
of subjectivity that can substantiate the objectivity of 
knowledge, but also legitimize it from evidence. Once this 
final task is a requirement, a psychology founded on inner 
vision (reflection) is required. Empiricism was right to 
refuse the dogmatic postulation of a transcendental subject 
as being inaccessible to experience and to defend the faithful 
description of subjectivity. The problem of empiricism is 
that it, due to naturalistic prejudices, described human 
consciousness badly (1931/1991; 1936/1976). It was blind to 
the intentionality of consciousness and, in particular, to the 
experiences in which the essences are captured. 
The only way to understand how a subject is able 
to know is by using a new psychology, which is descrip­
tive, intentional, a priori, and based on reflection. 
(Husserl, 1901/1984). With this, phenomenology becomes, 
first of all, a study of correlations between the structures 
of consciousness and the structures of the object (or 
objectivity). There is a correlation between linguistic 
signs and significant (or symbolic) experiences (Husserl, 
1901/1984) between names and nominal experiences, 
between propositions and categorial experiences. 
This situation can also be expressed as follows: to 
know a thing, it is necessary to know its ways of donation. 
And to understand the ways something manifests itself we 
should step back to consciousness. The condition for the 
object manifests itself leis not in itself but in conscious. 
Every phenomenon is a phenomenon of something for 
someone. And each kind of object has its own way of 
manifestation, and as consequence, . What is the difference 
between being aware of a theorem, a computer, a state of 
affairs, a concept, or a judicative experience? What is the 
difference between being aware of a table, seeing it, and 
being aware of the same table, without seeing it? According 
to Husserl, there are structural differences among the 
various forms of consciousness. And each form of intention 
experience has, as correlate, different kind of objects. The 
structure of experience in which a theorem is apprehend 
different from an experience in which the feeling of others 
is apprehend. 
It is necessary to emphasize that Husserl is not 
interested in establishing the factual conditions for know­
ledge, such as, for example, to have the frontal cortex 
developed, etc. What he is interested in is establishing the 
essential conditions, i.e., those conditions without which 
the scientific­theoretical knowledge would be inconceivable. 
What Husserl seeks, therefore, are conditions for a 
possibility of knowledge that is valid not only for humans, 
but also for any being endowed with consciousness, no 
matter if it is an alien or an angel (Husserl, 1900/1975). 
If an angel exists and possess theoretical knowledge, then 
the angel’s consciousness, in order to apprehend theoretical 
structures of truths, should necessarily be able to perform 
certain classes of experiences, such as symbolic, linguistic 
and intuitive experiences (categorical and sensitive).
Final considerations
Husserl’s main objective, in Logical investigations, 
was to employ phenomenology in solving epistemological 
problems. Motivated by epistemological problems, he 
stablishes the bases for a descriptive and a priori psy­
chology of the experiences. On this occasion, eidetic 
psychology was employed to examine and legitimize 
the subjective conditions of possibility of knowledge 
descriptively, including the intentionality of consciousness 
and, in particular, the experiences of meaning (in its various 
forms), perception (in its various forms), and knowledge. 
In elaborating a detailed analysis of the experiences 
through which theoretical knowledge becomes a pos­
session of the subject, Husserl does not only operate an 
argumentative critique of the empiricist conception of 
subjectivity, but also a descriptive one. 
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Resumo: Nas Investigações lógicas, publicadas por Husserl em 1900/1901, a fenomenologia é entendida como uma forma 
peculiar de psicologia descritiva, elaborada a fim de servir de fundamento da teoria do conhecimento. A peculiaridade dessa 
psicologia descritiva é que ela seria capaz de alcançar conhecimentos a priori sobre a psique. Neste artigo, procuramos mostrar, 
em contraste com o empirismo clássico dos séculos XVI e XVII e o idealismo transcendental kantiano, a peculiaridade do método 
psicológico presente nas Investigações lógicas, bem como o sentido pelo qual esse método foi posto como fundamento da 
teoria do conhecimento.
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de cette psychologie descriptive est qu’il serait en mesure d’atteindre une connaissance a priori sur le psychisme. Nous avons 
essayé de montrer, en contraste avec l’empirisme classique du XVIe et XVIIe siècles et l’idéalisme transcendantal de Kant, la 
particularité de cette méthode psychologique présent dans les Recherches logiques et le sens dans lequel cette méthode a été 
mise comme le fondement de la théorie de la connaissance.
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Resumen: En Investigaciones lógicas, de Husserl publicada en 1900/1901, se entiende la fenomenología como una forma peculiar 
de la psicología descriptiva, desarrollada para servir como base en la teoría del conocimiento. La peculiaridad de esta psicología 
descriptiva es que sería capaz de lograr un conocimiento a priori sobre la psique. En este texto se pretende mostrar, en contraste 
con el empirismo clásico de los siglos XVI y XVII y el idealismo trascendental de Kant, la peculiaridad de este método psicológico 
en esta obra y el sentido en que este método fue puesto como fundamento de la teoría del conocimiento.
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